من داحل المغارة: تراجع اهمية دراسة العلاقات الساسية

Inside the cave : the banality of I. R. studie
James KurthThe National Interest, fall 1998. من داخل المغارة: تراجع أهمية الدراسات في العلاقات الدولية

The twentieth century has certainly been among the most--if not the
most--grand and dramatic centuries in the history of international
relations. In the military sphere, there was the First World War, the
Second World War, and the Cold War (really a third world war). In the
economic sphere, there was the Great Depression of the 1930s, the
long boom of the 1950s-60s, and the oil shocks and world inflation of
the 1970s. History doesn't get any more grand and dramatic than this.
And at the end of the story comes the triumphal conclusion: the
United States as the sole superpower, as the hegemon of the global
economy, and as the first universal nation--bestriding the world more
grandly than any empire since that of Rome.

In the same century, the universities of the United States have become the greatest and richest academic institutions in the history of intellectual life. Part of this is the result of the numerous services that the universities performed for the U.S. government during the Cold War. Part of it is the result of great national wealth. And part of it is due to the numerous scholars that have flocked to the universal nation - the nation made up of peoples from everywhere and representing every culture - from all over the world.

Surely then, we might reasonably think, the theories that American academics have produced about America's international role, and about international relations generally, would be commensurably rich and grand. But of course, we know that this is not the case. Most readers of The National Interest will have only a vague idea of what is being written by leading academics about international affairs, and this with good reason. In the sole superpower, the higher learning about international relations does not loom large on the intellectual landscape. Its practitioners are not only rightly ignored by practical foreign policy officials; they are usually held in disdain by their fellow academics as well.

This essay will offer a map of the landscape of international relations thinking in the United States. In general, it is a view of a great American desert. It will point to a few *******ing and enlivening oases, however, and it will suggest how these oases might grow to reclaim the desert and make it bloom.

The Two Great Traditions
There have been two great traditions in the interpretation of international relations. One tradition emphasizes such ideas as the autonomous actions of sovereign states, the anarchy of international relations, the importance of national power, and the pursuit of national interests. For the past half century this perspective has been known as realism. The other tradition emphasizes such ideas as the necessity for states to engage in international cooperation, the harmony of interests, the importance of international economic exchanges, and the erosion of the nation-state. For the past quarter century, this perspective has been known as liberalism. Each perspective has its strengths (otherwise it could not have continued to exist decade after decade). Each has its weaknesses (and, taken seriously, these could have dire consequences for America's role in international affairs).

There is also a third perspective that we should consider. It is not yet really a great tradition in the interpretation of international relations, but rather a major tradition in the study of comparative politics. In the future, however, it may prove to be the most useful, even if the most demanding, perspective from which Americans can view their role in the world. It emphasizes the distinctive cultural characteristics of different societies, as they are expressed by different kinds of states in the international arena. Many of these cultural characteristics derive from the great religions. A few of these societies are nation-states (e.g., Britain, France, Germany, and Japan). Others are multicultural states (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Russia). And others are entire civilizations largely under the rule of one government (e.g., China and India).

The Realist Tradition: Power & Tragedy
The founding father of the realist tradition was Thucydides, as he developed this distinct perspective in his great book, The Peloponnesian War. Written twenty-four centuries ago, this awesome achievement has never been surpassed in its rich and lucid understanding of the reality, and the tragedy, of relations and wars between independent states.

In the modern era, the realist tradition was developed in Europe by Carl von Clausewitz in On War, Leopold von Ranke in The Primacy of Foreign Policy, and Friedrich Meinecke in Reason of State. In America, it has been ably represented by Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and George Kennan. The first two were refugees from Nazi Germany; Kennan has been the native-born American with the most sensitive and profound understanding of the reality and the tragedy of Central Europe in the twentieth century.

It is no accident that the great representatives of the realist tradition have been either Germans or Americans intimately familiar with Germany. The realist tradition was completely natural and logical for Continental powers operating within a balance of power system, particularly for a power at the center of the continent, i.e., Germany. As we shall see, however, it has not been so natural and logical for a great maritime power, even one on a continental scale, i.e., the United States.

The realist perspective was very good at explaining the great wars of the first half of the twentieth century. The scramble for colonies, the arms races, the competitive mobilizations of 1914 - all of these events leading up to the First World War fit realist concepts, especially the concept of the security dilemma. Similarly, the ruthless pursuit of national interest, the brutal display of military power, and the fatal consequences of neglecting realist precepts - all of these factors leading up to the Second World War fit realist concepts, especially the emphasis on the prime importance of national power.

Even within these successes of the realist interpretation, however, there could be found some anomalies. In regard to the First World War, it could be argued (and was argued by President Woodrow Wilson and other Americans) that the sudden outbreak and prolonged stalemate of that horrendous war, the very Great War itself, was a result of the failure, not the success, of realist concepts and precepts. Surely the balance of power system and the dual-alliance system, so much in keeping with realist notions, made the war as great as it was.

Similarly, in regard to the Second World War, it was all very well to say that realist concepts and precepts like balance of power and containment (as were advocated by Winston Churchill) could have prevented the war. But, as it happened, the leading British academic realist of the time, E.H. Carr, writing in his influential 1939 book The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, gave an extremely comprehensive and sophisticated argument for the policy of appeasement. If realist concepts and precepts could lead to such opposite policies as containment and appeasement on an issue of such importance as what to do about Nazi Germany, then they hardly could be of much practical use to statesmen trying to make decisions.

In between the two great world wars, there was a great economic calamity. The Great Depression clearly resulted from the economic disruption caused by the First World War and it even more clearly resulted in the Second World War. However, realists had virtually nothing to say about it. Their concepts and precepts, focused almost exclusively upon military ("security") issues, could not encompass economic ones, even if these had the gravest of consequences for international security.

Eventually (forty years later), there was developed a power-centered interpretation of the origin of the world depression. This was the account by Charles Kindleberger of MIT in his 1973 book, The World in Depression, 1929-1939. But Kindleberger was a distinguished economic historian, not a realist theorist of international affairs. Further, while he argued for the necessity of an "economic hegemon" that would ensure the smooth operation of the international economy, realists have always argued that a hegemon is what every other power would, or at least should, strive to prevent.

The second half of the twentieth century was the really American part of the century. How did realist concepts and precepts fit the major military and economic occurrences of this period

The realist perspective could readily explain the Cold War. The division of Europe into two blocs, the competition for influence in the Third World, and the competitive arms race all fit realist concepts, especially the policy of containment and the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Even within this success of the realist interpretation, however, there again could be found some anomalies. In regard to the division of Europe, it could be argued (and was argued by that eminent realist, George Kennan) that U.S. national interests would better be served by a policy of disengagement that would create a neutral buffer zone in Central Europe. Similarly, in regard to the Vietnam War, a prime example of competition for influence in the Third World, Hans Morgenthau argued against the U.S. intervention, while Henry Kissinger was in favor of it. Again, if realist concepts and precepts could lead to such opposite policies as containment and disengagement in regard to the Soviet Union and to such opposite policies as intervention and non-intervention in the Vietnam War, then they hardly could be of much practical use to statesmen (even Kissinger) trying to make decisions. In the midst of the Cold War and at the end of the Vietnam War, there came the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the oil price revolution. The first clearly resulted from the decline in the dollar generated by the Vietnam War, and the second was accelerated and deepened on account of the October 1973 Middle East war. In turn, they created instability in important military spheres, such as U.S. containment of the Soviet Union and U.S. influence in the Middle East. Despite this, academic realists had virtually nothing to say about these momentous international occurrences. Again, their concepts and precepts, founded almost exclusively upon military issues, could not encompass economic ones, even if these had serious consequences for international security.

Finally, near the end of the twentieth century came one of the greatest, and the strangest, events in the history of international relations, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. What did this event tell us about the validity and vitality of realist concepts and precepts?

On the one hand, a central cause of the Soviet collapse was the determined policies of containment and military buildup of President Ronald Reagan. Ironically, however, at the time that Reagan was pursuing these policies, most distinguished realists, including Kennan and even Kissinger, criticized them. They did not think of Reagan as being a realist but rather as an ideologue, even a simplistic idealist (and "idealism" had always been soundly condemned by realists).

On the other hand, as Reagan himself knew, his military policies could only work because of the basic economic weaknesses of the Soviet economy, particularly the inability of the Soviet Union to compete in international markets. This was the second central cause of the Soviet collapse. And on this the realists had nothing to say.

The realist perspective, thus, has had a rather checkered record in interpreting the great international occurrences of the twentieth century. In the first half of the century, when Europe and its balance of power were central to international affairs, realism at best could account for the two world wars, but even there its interpretation was ambiguous and underdetermining. In the second half of the century, when America and the bipolar system were central to international affairs, realism's record was even less impressive. It could account for the beginning and continuing of the Cold War, but it could not account in important cases (like Vietnam) for how the Cold War was conducted and how it came to an end.

The real strengths of realism do not lie in its concepts and precepts, in its clear and accurate understanding of the reality of international affairs. Rather, they lie in its attitudes and sensibilities, in its mature and profound understanding of the tragedy of international affairs. This is ironic, of course, given the general disdain that most realists have for such "soft" phenomena as attitudes and sensibilities. But these and the understanding of tragedy that they bring are the very qualities that lift the writings of Morgenthau, Kissinger, and, above all, Kennan to the heights. They understand Thucydides, and like Thucydides they also understand Sophocles. Thucydides would recognize each of them to be one of his own.

Structural Realism: The Academic Revision of the Realist Tradition
Morgenthau, Kennan, and Kissinger, of course, were very different in the degree to which they actually made or influenced U.S. foreign policy in the course of their careers. Morgenthau was a well-known commentator, Kennan a prominent diplomat, and Kissinger a famous national security advisor and secretary of state. But they were all prolific in their writings in the leading opinion journals that dealt with international affairs at the time, such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and The New Republic.

They were also very different in the extent that they were academics in the course of their careers. Morgenthau taught for many years at the University of Chicago, Kennan wrote from the Institute for Advanced Study near Princeton, and Kissinger taught for about a decade at Harvard. But none of them saw himself as an academic; they were in the academic world, but not of it. For such men, the fact that their writings were characterized as being more about reality and tragedy than about rigor and theory was not a serious criticism. This was also true of two other distinguished realists, Robert W. Tucker and Robert Osgood, both of Johns Hopkins University. Although principally academics, they too published extensively in the leading opinion journals.

Most academics, however, are only academics. In the course of their careers, they have been paid a salary only by a university; they are one-dimensional people. They therefore have not had the breadth of experience to give them a sense of the reality of international relations; nor have they had the depth of experience to give them a sense of its tragedy. These are the hollow men, and the shallow men, too.

For such people, there are only a few kinds of achievements possible in regard to international relations. One of them is to sit down and spin out theories that fellow academics will praise as being rigorous and original. (Merely being realistic and responsible, in contrast, will not evoke their praise.) In truth, most academics are only concerned about the good opinion of about a dozen other academic specialists in their particular sub-sub-field.

It was only a matter of time before the realist tradition would be appropriated by the theoretical academics. The result was structural realism.

Realism had often assumed a balance of power system, one composed of several great powers. This was indeed realistic up through the first half of the twentieth century. With the advent after 1945 of the bipolar system consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union, however, a main assumption of realism ceased to be realistic

One of the first scholars to think systematically about the special dynamics of a bipolar system was Kenneth Waltz, who in 1964 published an important article on "the stability of a bipolar world", and who became one of two leading international relations scholars at the University of California at Berkeley (the other, whom we will mention later, was Ernst Haas). Waltz continued to develop the idea that different international systems were distinguished by different numbers of leading powers and different distributions of power among them, i.e., by different international structures. These different international structures of power give rise to different kinds of international behavior (including stability or instability). In 1979, he published his thoughts about international structures in Theory of International Politics, thus becoming the founding father of structural realism. Waltz's theory was so general and abstract that it could be seen as more a taxonomy or a tautology than a true theory. It is no accident that his book normally is only cited in the academic journals dealing with international relations, such as International Security and World Politics, and never in the policy journals such as Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, Foreign Policy, and World Policy Journal. But in the academic literature it has been cited profusely.

When Waltz applied his abstract theory to policy issues, he demonstrated why he was ignored by policy professionals. Waltz argued that international stability would be increased by nuclear proliferation; more nuclear powers would make for less international aggression. There probably has not been a single foreign policy professional in the U.S. government who has found this notion to be helpful.

International Security Studies: The Highest Stage of Academic Realism
But Waltz should not be dismissed as being only an academic eccentric. He also mentored about two dozen younger academic specialists in international relations and security studies. They have written in the 1980s and 1990s a large number of useful (and realistic) books on such topics as the dynamics of multipolar systems, alliance formation, arms races, offensive versus defensive strategies, and stable versus unstable deterrence. The international security scholars also publish and debate extensively in the leading academic journal in their field, which is appropriately tided International Security.

The most distinguished of these international security scholars is John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago. His book Conventional Deterrence (1983) presented an analysis, with historical cases, of how deterrence based upon conventional (nonnuclear) weapons had worked or had failed. In the mid-1980s, this book was highly relevant and applicable for senior U.S. military officers, who were then developing nonnuclear deterrence strategies against the Soviet Union (e.g., the Air-Land Battle Doctrine of the army and the Maritime Strategy of the navy).

There are other distinguished scholars who have been part of the structural realist school, but who have developed theories and analyses of international security that have been informed and sophisticated in their use of history, as well as relevant and applicable to contemporary issues in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. They are Barry Posen of MIT, Jack Snyder of Columbia, and Stephen Walt of the University of Chicago. Together with Mearsheimer, they have made the contemporary American academic version of realism worthy of the great tradition.

However, even the international security version of realism has had difficulty in interpreting the post-Cold War world and America's role within it. In 1990, Mearsheimer published a major article entitled "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", which argued that the new multipolar system would produce greater instability than the old bipolar one (he entitled another version of this article "Why We Will Miss the Cold War"). A little later, he became especially concerned about the threat that Russia posed to Ukraine and argued that Ukraine should remain a nuclear power. This fidelity to the notions of the stability of a bipolar world and to the stability of nuclear multipolarity doubtless was consistent with the theories of Kenneth Waltz. But it was remote from the realities of the new international system.

The international security version of realism remains useful in interpreting the cases of military confrontations between states. At the present time, these are largely those old familiar conflicts in the Middle East (involving Israel, Iraq, or Iran) and in South Asia (involving India and Pakistan). In the future they may come to include conflicts between China and the United States. But such military confrontations are not now among the central realities of contemporary international relations and U.S. foreign policy. And on the role of the United States as the sole superpower, as the hegemon of the global economy, and as the first universal nation, academic realists have had nothing to say.

The Liberal Tradition: Wealth & Harmony
The liberal tradition has no founding father comparable to Thucydides. But liberals themselves nominate as their early authors such figures as Hugo Grotius (the general good of international law), Immanuel Kant (the peaceful nature of republics), and Adam Smith (the beneficial consequences of free trade).

It is no accident that Grotius was Dutch and that Adam Smith was British. (Kant was technically a Prussian, but the least-Prussian Prussian in history.) The liberal tradition was completely natural and logical for maritime powers operating within an international trading system. This was the case with the Netherlands and Britain - and the United States.

More subtly, the liberal tradition, especially in its harmony-of-interests form, has been useful for two particular kinds of hegemonic powers. One is the leading maritime and commercial power in the world, a role played successively by the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Such powers are naturally in a position to shape and enforce an international law of the sea that serves their maritime interests, and an international law of trade that serves their commercial interests.

The liberal tradition has also been useful for a second kind of hegemonic power. This is the dominant power within a particular region. Such powers rarely existed alone, and never existed for long, on the European continent. In the world beyond Europe and across the seas, however, Britain was the dominant power in much of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Even more indisputably, the United States has been the dominant power in the Americas. Such dominant powers naturally and logically develop the notion that their views - obviously broader and higher than those of the lesser powers in their region - and the international organizations that implement these views (and are dominated by the dominant power) have the quality of being in the common good, the general interest, indeed the harmony-of-interests of all the powers of the region.

How good has the liberal tradition been in interpreting the great international occurrences of the twentieth century? Given its basic concepts, it was hardly capable of predicting the outbreak and prolonged stalemate of the First World War (indeed, liberals are notorious for having predicted perpetual peace on the very eve of that war). Once the war occurred, however, liberals like Woodrow Wilson developed their own distinctive explanations for why it happened (i.e., too much realism on the part of European leaders) and how such wars could be prevented in the future (i.e., by such means as international organization, international law, and collective security). Of course, these means then proved to be utter failures in preventing the Second World War.

The liberal tradition might have been expected to do better in the realm of the international economy. However, believing in the smooth operation of free markets, it failed to predict the Great Depression. Once that occurred, however, liberals like Secretary of State Cordell Hull developed their own distinctive explanations for why it happened (tariff barriers and trade blocs) and how such depressions could be prevented in the future (a more free market in the international economy). But such pre******ions were fruitless until, as a result of the Second World War, the United States was in a position to become the economic hegemon of the international economy. That was hardly a liberal idea until Charles Kindleberger developed it.

In short, as a theory of international relations, liberalism was pretty much a total failure during the first half of the twentieth century. Of course, there could always be found many Americans who said that if only Wilson's or Hull's plans had been realized, then we could have prevented the Great Depression and the Second World War. But to most Europeans and to realist (and European-minded) Americans, it was no accident that these plans had not been realized; they were indeed unrealistic. To the realists, the liberals seemed at best simple and silly and at worst stupid and dangerous. And, given the realities and the tragedies of the international situation at mid-century, what the realists thought about the liberals was right.

The second half of the twentieth century was the really American part of the century. How did liberal concepts and precepts fit the major military and economic occurrences of this period? Is it possible that, as the century became more American, the American and liberal perspective became more valid (even more realistic)?

The liberal tradition had a hard time dealing with the Cold War. Liberals could say that if the Soviet Union would only dismantle its command economy, its autarchic system, and its totalitarian regime, then there would be no Cold War - but this obviously was not very useful policy advice during the Cold War itself.

The liberals had a much better record in dealing with the American-led side of the bipolar conflict, especially in regard to Western Europe. Here, the liberal concepts and precepts of free markets and liberal democracies were established, and they operated and succeeded superbly. But they only did so because Western Europe was American-led, because the United States was the hegemonic economic and military power there. Once again, the liberals found it almost impossible to articulate a concept of hegemony and the necessity for it.

Instead, liberal accounts of international relations in the 1950s and 1960s focused upon international organizations, first upon the United Nations and then, when that had demonstrably failed, upon regional economic organizations, especially the European Economic Community. At the same time, most liberals carefully managed to ignore regional military organizations, such as NATO. To have done otherwise would have forced them to accept the reality and the necessity of the United States as a military hegemon.

Structural Liberalism: The Academic Revision of the Liberal Tradition
The focus upon international economic organizations was very pronounced among academic liberals. For a time in the 1960s, "regional integration" seemed to be their preferred solution for just about any international problem.

The founding father of regional integration studies was Ernst Haas, the other leading international relations scholar at the University of California at Berkeley. Haas' major books were The Uniting of Europe (1958) and Beyond the Nation-State (1964), whose titles nicely expressed his fondest hopes. In later years, he continued to write, but about this or that obscure UN agency - that is, he wrote more and more about less and less.

With the international economic disruptions of the 1970s - not only the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, but the oil price revolution and worldwide inflation - liberal theorists of international relations finally had some important events about which they had something useful - or at least interesting - to say, and about which the realists were silent or ignorant. This was the time of the birth of the academic field of international political economy. Writers on the politics of the international economy began to dominate the old liberal academic journal, International Organization, which hitherto had devoted itself to studies of the United Nations, the European Community, and a variety of meaningless regional organizations in the Third World.

The liberals recognized that international economic organizations by themselves were not enough to prevent worldwide economic turmoil. (Indeed, one such organization, OEEC, had mightily helped to produce that very turmoil.) They were told by Kindleberger that some sort of economic hegemon was necessary to maintain stability in the international economy, and many of them now acknowledged (at least temporarily) that this was the case, giving birth to a new sub-sub-field of international relations called "hegemonic stability studies." However, the United States, which had been that hegemon, was now in economic decline relative to the rising economic powers of the European Community, Japan, and OPEC. The academic liberals had discovered American hegemony at the very moment that it seemed to be on the verge of disappearing. What was to be done?

For liberals, the answer was inevitable. There was, they reassuringly announced, life after hegemony. It was to be found in some new version of their old friend, international organization. One such version was put forward by Robert Keohane of Harvard in his aptly entitled book, After Hegemony (1984). Keohane acknowledged that American hegemony and power had originally been necessary to set up important international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But once these organizations became established and institutionalized, their salutary principles and practices could assume a life of their own and could carry on even in the absence of American power. Liberal structures, or structural liberalism, could maintain the stability of the international economy "after hegemony." Keohane thus became the founding father of structural liberalism.

International Regime Studies: The Lowest Form of Academic Liberalism
The notion that liberal principles and practices - liberal structures - in international relations could carry on in the absence of American power was captivating to academic liberals. They had always avoided (and some had energetically hated) the realities of American power anyway. In the 1980s, they enthusiastically developed a new sub-subfield called "international regime studies." The use of the word "regime" in this con**** had nothing to do with previous usages which referred to independent governments (e.g., "authoritarian regime"); quite the contrary, "international regimes" were those liberal principles and practices that were willingly, even automatically, followed by states who cooperated with each other in regard to a large number of international issues and international arenas. These were said to range all the way from "the international non-proliferation regime" (dealing with nuclear proliferation), through "the international monetary regime", to "the international human rights regime."

In the 1990s, American power has not only returned but has risen to new heights. Now, there would seem to be no doubt that there is an American hegemon supporting and advancing all those liberal principles and practices in all those international issues and arenas. But international regime studies carries on, analyzing in minute detail the intricacies of "norms", "rules", and "procedures" among states, while never discussing the power that makes them all work. Regimes without regimens, norms without the normal behavior of states, rules without rulers, procedures without prowess, above all, banalities without even truisms - it doesn't get any worse than this. Most of this academic make-work is done by people who are with second-rate universities, third-rate minds, and fourth-rate temperaments.

The War Between the Sub-Fields
In the 1990s, then, it became evident that neither structural realism nor structural liberalism, neither international security studies (ISS) nor international political economy (IPE), had much to say that was interesting and relevant about the central realities of international relations in this decade - the United States as the sole superpower, as the hegemon of the global economy, and as the first universal nation. Given this general incapacity, one might reasonably have expected that a certain humility might have developed within the two sub-fields of international relations and even a certain harmony between them. But of course, since we are talking about academics, we know that this has not been the case. Academics may be petty, but they are never humble.

For the most part, the two academic subfields of ISS and IPE loathe each other. On occasion, I have heard a scholar in one of the subfields say a good thing about a scholar in the other. It is much more common, however, for them to ignore each other, to revile each other, or even to plot against each other. The realists revile the liberals for being naive, even pusillanimous, about the realities of power. The liberals revile the realists for being simplistic, even primitive, about the subtleties of cooperation.

Like other academic wars, the war between ISS and IPE will end not with a bang but with a whimper. More exactly, it will end with the denial of tenure. Although the leaders of ISS and IPE have dominated the study of international relations at the leading American universities for more than two decades, they no longer dominate the tenure process in their academic departments; they thus are not reproducing themselves unto the next generation of tenured professors. Realists, who claim to understand power, and liberals, who claim to understand process, have lost power over the tenure process to two other sub-fields of international relations. We have not even mentioned these sub-fields up to this point because of their utter lack of interest and relevance to anyone outside of themselves. One is Rational Choice theory; the other is Post-Modern theory.

The first is hyper-rationalist; the second is anti-rationalist; they both are unreadable. But because they are in accord with the more general fads and fashions in the social sciences in the 1990s (Rational Choice in economics, Post-Modernism in history and sociology), they dominate the new tenured appointments in political science. This means that in most American universities in the future, the study of international relations will be even more uninteresting and irrelevant than it is now.

The Union of Realism and Liberalism
Rising above these squalid squabbles have been a few (too few) scholars who have been able to understand and to use both the realist and the liberal perspectives, even to integrate both the security and the economic modes of analysis. Since in the real world of international relations both power and wealth, both security and economy are integral and at the center, these scholars have been the true realists. And, in being able to appreciate more than one perspective, they also have been the true liberals.

One of these is Robert Gilpin, who taught for many years at Princeton. His major books have masterfully integrated security and economic analysis: U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (1975), War and Change in World Politics (1981), and The Political Economy of International Relations (1987). Gilpin also quickly followed Kindleberger in explaining the central importance of U.S. hegemony, not only in ordering the international economy but also the international system more generally. Another such scholar has been David Calleo of Johns Hopkins University. His major books likewise have masterfully integrated security and economic analysis and described the central importance of U.S. hegemony: America and the World Political Economy (1973) and The Impervious Economy (1982). The integrated mode of analysis exemplified by Gilpin and Calleo provides a way of interpreting two of the three features of the contemporary U.S. role in international relations that we have been noting. These are the United States as the sole superpower and as the hegemon of the global economy.

It was probably no accident that both Gilpin and Calleo were also very knowledgeable about particular continental European nations. Gilpin's works included France in the Age of the Scientific State (1968); Calleo's included The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and World Order (1978). Their ability to rise above the one-dimensional qualities of their colleagues probably owed something to their European understanding.

The third scholar who masterfully integrated realism and liberalism was Hedley Bull, who was probably the best international relations theorist of his generation in the British Commonwealth. Although Bull did not emphasize economic issues, he did magnificently combine an appreciation, even a tragic sense, of both the reality of international anarchy and, despite and because of this, the necessity for international cooperation. The paradox and the subtlety of his analysis are expressed in the title of his major book, The Anarchical Society (1977).

The Cultural Perspective: Faith & Identity
An interpretation of international relations that is based upon the union of realism and liberalism, upon the integration of security and economic modes of analysis, is well suited to comprehend such central realities as the United States as the sole superpower and the hegemon of the global economy. But it is not enough. By itself, a focus upon these two features of the U.S. hegemonic role will lead to a rather linear view of the future of international relations: U.S. military power and economic leadership will continue to shape the rest of the world in their own way for a long time to come. This is a view of the future that is widely held among American political and economic elites in the late 1990s. At the end of one American Century, they look forward to a second.

However, if we view international relations with a third perspective, that of culture, we arrive at a more complex prospectus. The American role in the world in fact will be greatly determined by the interaction between American culture and the culture of other major states and societies. The culture of the first universal nation is not as universal as that nation's liberal elites like to think. When the United States deploys its military superpower and economic hegemony to promote and spread its distinctive culture, other cultures can be expected to resist and react. The result is "the clash of civilizations" that has been so famously described by another great American scholar, Samuel Huntington of Harvard.

Huntington is widely recognized as being the most distinguished political scientist of the last third of the twentieth century. He has written masterly works in comparative politics (Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968), American politics (American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 1981), and now international relations (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996). He has been extensively cited in the academic literature. But he has also periodically served as an adviser to prominent U.S. policymakers, and he has been prolific in his writings in the leading opinion journals dealing with international relations.

As is well known, Huntington argues that the main conflicts of the twenty-first century will not be the ideological conflicts of the twentieth century or the national conflicts of the nineteenth century. They instead will be cultural conflicts, conflicts between the great civilizations.

Almost all cultures are derived from prior religions, even those cultures of today that think of themselves as secular (e.g., the Western). Cultural conflicts thus are about faith and identity; they are fundamental and therefore often involve "fundamentalists." Huntington emphasizes several great civilizations: Western, derived from Latin Christianity; Orthodox, derived from Greek Christianity; Islamic; Hindu; Sinic, derived from Confucianism; and Japanese. (He also mentions Latin American, Buddhist, and African civilizations.) There have been conflicts between these different civilizations in ages past, and they will continue for ages to come. But the fundamental conflict of our era, he maintains, will be the conflict between Western civilization and the others - "the West versus the Rest."

For most of the American Century, the leading power of Western civilization has been the United States. It is now also the sole superpower and the hegemon of the global economy. This means that the United States is capable of promoting and spreading not only its conception of world order and global economy, but also the culture of the first universal nation. Many of America's elites believe this culture to be universal; many of the elites of other states and societies believe it to be distinctively Western (or even American) and therefore in some degree alien to their own culture. This is the fundamental reason why there is a conflict between the West and the rest.

The Universal Culture and the Liberal Tradition
What are the main features of this supposedly universal culture? It turns out that they are very similar to what we have been describing as the liberal tradition in international relations. Universal culture is largely liberal ideology.

Four decades ago, Louis Hartz wrote about the peculiar quality of the American worldview in his renowned The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). Two decades ago, Samuel Huntington expanded on this theme with his account of the American Creed in American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Now, the true believer in the liberal tradition, the United States, is trying to make it the universal creed of the entire world.

The fundamental elements of the liberal tradition and American Creed are free markets and equal opportunity, free elections and liberal democracy, and constitutionalism and the rule of law. The core element is individualism. Most of these elements were already in place in the United States by the early nineteenth century. They were well described by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (1835).

The liberal tradition and American Creed definitely do not include as elements hierarchy, community, tradition, and custom. This has meant that they have been in fundamental opposition to almost all of the great religious traditions, for whom both hierarchy and community are integral (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and even, to a degree, Buddhism). The one religion that is not based upon these is Protestantism, especially the Reformed versions of Protestantism (e.g., Calvinism, Puritanism, Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism) that so much shaped the origins of the United States. Alone among the great religions, Reformed Protestantism totally rejects hierarchy, community, custom, and tradition.

When American Protestantism underwent secularization, it took a unique form that was unlike the secularization of other religions. The liberal tradition, the American Creed, and, more recently, the Human Rights ideology have been the result. Although in the last generation American political and intellectual elites may appear to have replaced the American Creed with the universal conception of Human Rights, Human Rights really carries the American Creed to a logical conclusion and to a universal extent. Although not themselves Protestant, the liberal tradition, the American Creed, and the Human Rights ideology are the product of a Protestant culture and are a secularized version of Protestantism.(1)

The liberal tradition in America and the liberal tradition in international relations have always had much in common. This explains why in America the long war between the realist tradition and the liberal tradition has never been an equal one. The liberal tradition is comfortably in the American grain; the realist tradition is sensed as being somehow un-American. The only time the realist tradition can receive a wide hearing is when the security of the American nation is in peril, e.g., during the two World Wars and the Cold War. Conversely, when the nation is enjoying peace and prosperity (never more so than in the 1990s), liberalism will be triumphant if not also triumphalist.

And so the first universal nation is now poised to enter into a great clash of civilizations, into what will really be a war between a religious heresy (secularized Protestantism) and all other religions. It is the liberal tradition, with its presumption of harmony and its resulting heedlessness, that could get us into this war. It is the realist tradition, with its sense of tragedy and its resulting attitude of prudence, that could keep us out. But we already know which of these two traditions will prevail. The liberal tradition is not only in America, it is America. The realist tradition, in contrast, is not only rarely in America, it is un-American. The tragedy of America could be that America is incapable of a sense of tragedy - and the tragedy of the American discipline of international relations is that few of its practitioners would make any sense of such a proposition.